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1. Introduction
Many antitrust cases revolve around compatibility issues (called interoperability in software
markets). For example, the European Microsoft case focused on the question of whether Mi-
crosoft reduced interoperability between its personal computer (PC) operating system - Win-
dows, a near monopoly product - and rival server operating systems (a complementary market)
to drive rivals out of the workgroup server market. Microsofts share of workgroup server oper-
ating systems rose substantially from 20% at the start of 1996 to near 60% in 2001 (see Figure
1) and the European Commission (2004) alleged that at least some of this increase was due to
a strategy of making rival server operating systems work poorly with Windows. The possibility
of such leveraging of market power from the PC to the server market was suggested by Bill
Gates in a 1997 internal e-mail: What were trying to do is to use our server control to do
new protocols and lock out Sun and Oracle specically....the symmetry that we have between the
client operating system and the server operating system is a huge advantage for us. Microsoft
eventually lost the case leading to the largest nes in 50 years of EU anti-trust history.1
Statements like those in Bill Gates e-mail could just be management rhetoric. Indeed,
the rationality of such foreclosure strategies has been strongly challenged in the past by the
Chicago School critique of leverage theory (e.g. Bork, 1978). For example, suppose one
rm has a monopoly for one product but competes with other rms in a market for a second
product, which is used by customers in xed proportions with the rst. The Chicago School
observed that the monopolist in the rst market did not have to monopolize the second market
to extract monopoly rents. The monopolist will even benet from the presence of other rms
in this second market when there is product di¤erentiation.2 Following the Chicago tradition,
there has been much work on trying to derive e¢ ciency explanations for many practices that
were previously seen as anti-competitive.3
More recently, studies of exclusive dealing (Bernheim and Whinston, 1998) and tying4 have
1The initial interoperability complaint began in 1998 after beta versions of Windows 2000 were released. In
2004, the EU ordered Microsoft to pay e497 million for the abuse and supply interoperability information. In
2008, the EU ned Microsoft an additional e899 million for failure to comply with the earlier decision. See
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microsoft_Corp_v_Commission).
2For a formal statement of this point, see Whinston (1990), Proposition 3.
3For example, Bowman (1957), Adams and Yellen (1976), Schmalensee (1984), McAfee, McMillan and Whin-
ston (1989).
4See Whinston (1990), Farrell and Katz (2000), Carlton and Waldman (2002) among others.
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shown that rational foreclosure in markets for complements is possible in several models.5 Most
of these models have the feature that exclusionary strategies are not necessarily protable in
the short run. However, such strategies through their impact on investment, learning by doing,
etc., can make current competitors less e¤ective in the future, making the exclusionary strategy
protable in the long run.
This paper makes several contributions. We propose a new theory of foreclosure through
interoperability degradation and apply it to the market for PCs and servers. The theory suggests
a relatively straightforward policy-relevant test for foreclosure incentives that can be used in
many contexts. To implement the test we develop a structural econometric approach using
detailed market level data (quarterly data from the US PC and server markets between 1996
and 2001), which requires extending a random coe¢ cient model to allow for complementary
products. We nd strong and robust incentives for Microsoft to degrade interoperability as the
competition authorities alleged.6
In our theory, the reduction of competition in the complementary (server) market allows
the PC monopolist to more e¤ectively price discriminate between customers with heterogeneous
demand. If customers with high elasticity of demand for PCs also have low willingness to pay
for servers, server purchases can be used for second degree price discrimination. A monopolist
both of PC and server operating systems would lower the price for the PC operating system and
extract surplus from customers with inelastic PC demand by charging higher server operating
system prices. Competition on the server market will limit the ability to price discriminate in
this way. By reducing interoperability, the monopolist can reduce competition on the server
market, re-establishing the ability to price discriminate.
Although the incentive can exist in theory, whether it is relevant in practice depends on
the interplay between two e¤ects. The PC operating system monopolist benets from reducing
interoperability because he gains share in the server market. But because interoperability lowers
the quality of rival servers, some customers will purchase fewer PCs, and this reduces his prots
from the PC operating system monopoly. Our test quanties the magnitude of this di¤erence.
5See Rey and Tirole (2007) for a comprehensive review of this literature and Whinston (2001) for an informal
survey in relation to some aspects of the U.S. vs. Microsoft case.
6Hence, our static motivation complements dynamic theories, for example those based on applications network
e¤ects, that have been shown to generate anti-competitive incentives to extend monopoly (e.g. Carlton and
Waldman, 2002). These dynamic e¤ects would only make our static foreclosure incentives stronger.
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For the argument we are making, modelling the heterogeneity between buyers is essential
for generating foreclosure incentives. Modelling customer heterogeneity in a exible way is
also a central feature of recent approaches for estimating demand systems in di¤erentiated
product markets. We therefore rst develop the theory on the basis of a discrete choice model
with random coe¢ cients as used in demand estimations by Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995,
henceforth BLP). We extend this approach to allowing complementarity between two markets
and compare our results to those from existing approaches such as Gentzkow (2007) and Song
and Chintagunta (2006). We show theoretically and empirically how di¤erent assumptions on
complementarity will a¤ect foreclosure incentives. For example, we show how overly strong
restrictions on the assumed form of complementarity (e.g. not allowing a PC only purchase)
can cause the econometrician to underestimate the scope for foreclosure.
One caveat to our approach is that although we can test whether there is a foreclosure
incentive, our methodology cannot unequivocally resolve the question of whether foreclosure
occurs and how much of the change in market shares was due to interoperability constraints.7
The paper is structured in the following way. Section 2 gives the basic idea and presents
the core theoretical results relating to foreclosure. Section 3 details the econometrics, section 4
the data, section 5 the results and section 6 concludes. In the online Appendices we give more
details of proofs (A), data (B), estimation techniques (C and E), derivations (D) and robustness
(F).
2. Modelling Foreclosure Incentives
Our basic approach is to measure, at any point in time, the incentives for a monopolist in a
primary market to reduce the quality of a rival in a complementary market through changes in
the interoperability features of its monopoly product. In our application we examine whether
Microsoft had an incentive to degrade interoperability between its PC operating system and
rival server operating systems in order to foreclose competition in the server operating system
market. In this section we give an overview of how we identify this incentive.
7Demonstrating that foreclosure took place through interoperability degradation requires a more in-depth
market investigation. In particular, we cannot separately identify whether the introduction of a new Microsoft
operating system only enhanced the quality of Microsoft servers relative to others, or whether the decreases in
interoperability also decreased the e¤ective quality of rival server operating systems. In the anti-trust case, the
European Commission (2004) claimed that changes in Windows technology did seriously reduce interoperability.
The evidence in this paper is consistent with the claim that Microsoft had an incentive to do this.
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2.1. The Test for Foreclosure Incentives. To outline our approach, we rst introduce
some notation that will be maintained for the rest of the paper. There are J di¤erent types of
PCs o¤ered in the market. A buyer of PC j has to pay the price p^j for the hardware and !
for the operating system of the monopolist.8 In the data, we observe the vector of PC prices
pj = p^j + !  1 with element pj = p^j + !. For servers we observe the corresponding vector of
hardware/software total system prices pk = p^k + !k with element pk = p^k + !k, where p^k is
the hardware price of server k and !k is the price for the operating system running on that
server.9 We use the notation !k = !M when the server product k uses the PC monopolists
server operating system. We parameterize the degree of interoperability of the operating system
of server k with the monopolists PC operating system as ak 2 [0; 1]. We set ak = 1 for all
servers that run the server operating system of the monopolist and ak = a  1 for servers with
competing operating systems.
Given the price vectors we can dene demand functions for total demand for PCs, q(p
j
;pk; a),
and the total demand for the monopolists server operating system as qM (pj ;pk; a). Total prots
of the monopolist are given by:
(pj;pk; a) = (!   c)q(pj;pk; a) + (!M   cM )qM (pj;pk; a), (1)
where c and cM are the corresponding marginal costs for the monopolists PC and server oper-
ating system respectively.10
We are interested in the incentive of the monopolist to decrease the interoperability para-
meter a. By the envelope theorem, there will be such an incentive if:
(!   c) dq(pj;pk; a)
da

!;!M
+ (!M   cM ) dqM (pj;pk; a)
da

!;!M
< 0 (2)
The demand derivatives with respect to the interoperability parameter are total derivatives of
the respective output measures holding the monopolists operating system prices constant. This
8Over our sample period Apple, Linux and others had less than 5% of the PC market, so that Microsoft could
be considered the monopoly supplier. We therefore do not use subscripts for PC operating system prices. We use
Mas the subscript when we refer to prices and quantities of sales of the monopolists server operating system.
9Note that we treat two servers with di¤erent operating system as di¤erent server products even if the hardware
is identical.
10The marginal cost can be thought of as being very close to zero in software markets.
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derivative contains the direct e¤ect of interoperability on demand as well as the impact of the
price responses to a change in interoperability by all rival software and hardware producers.
Total demand for PCs will increase with greater interoperability because of complementarity
between PCs and servers. Greater interoperability means that some customers start purchasing
more PCs as the monopolists rival servers have become more attractive. At the same time we
expect the demand for the monopolists server operating system, qM , to decrease when interop-
erability increases because some customers will switch to a rival server operating system. The
relative impact on server and PC operating system demand from interoperability degradation
will therefore be critical to the incentives to foreclose. Rearranging terms we obtain that there
is an incentive to decrease interoperability at the margin if:
!M   cM
!   c >  
dq(pj;pk;a)
da

!;!M
dqM (pj;pk;a)
da

!;!M
(3)
On the left hand side of equation (3) we have the relative margin e¤ect. Interoperability
degradation will only be protable if the margin on the server operating system of the monopolist
(!M   cM ) su¢ ciently exceeds the margin on the PC operating system (!   c). We call the
expression on the right hand side of (3) the relative output e¤ect as it measures the
relative impact of a change in interoperability on demand for the PC operating system (the
numerator increases with interoperability) and the monopolists server operating system (the
denominator decreases with interoperability) respectively.
Our estimation approach is designed to verify whether the strict inequality (3) holds in the
data. Why is this a good test for foreclosure incentives when one might expect an optimal
choice of interoperability by the monopolist to lead to a strict equality? First, it is costly
to change operating systems to reduce the degree of interoperability and there are time lags
between the design of the less interoperable software and its di¤usion on the market. Second,
non-Microsoft server operating system vendors such as Novell and Linux sought to overcome the
reduction in interoperability through a variety of measures such as developing bridgeproducts,
redesigning their own software, reverse engineering, etc. Third, there are many reasons why
it will be impossible for a monopolist to reduce all interoperability to zero (i.e. making rival
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server operating systems non-functional). One reason is that there are di¤erent server market
segments. For example, in European Commission (2004) it was claimed that Microsoft had
an incentive to exclude rivals in workgroup server markets (the market which we focus on),
but not in the markets for web servers or enterprise servers.11 The protocols that achieve
interoperability for web servers may, however, provide some interoperability with workgroup
servers thus preventing full interoperability degradation. This means the monopolist would want
to reduce quality of the server rivals further if he could. Finally, since the late 1990s, anti-trust
action in the US and EU may have slowed down Microsofts desire to reduce interoperability.
All these reasons suggest that in the presence of foreclosure incentives we should nd a strict
incentive to foreclose at the margin, which is why we focus our analysis on estimating the
relative margin and output e¤ects.
2.2. Measuring the Relative Margin E¤ect. The margins on PC and server operating
systems are very hard to observe directly. For our econometric estimations we only have prices
of PCs and servers bought inclusive of an operating system. While there do exist some list
prices of operating systems that allow us to infer an order of magnitude, we have to estimate
the operating system margins from the data. For this estimation we therefore have to impose a
specic model of price setting. Given the complementarity between software and hardware as
well as between PCs and servers, the move order in price setting is important for determining
the pricing incentives for the monopolist. We assume that the hardware and software companies
set their prices simultaneously so that the price the software company charges is directly added
to whatever price the hardware company charges for the computer. This assumption seems
consistent with what we observe in the market as Microsoft e¤ectively controlled the price of
the software paid by end users through licensing arrangements.12 Maximizing equation (1) with
respect to the PC operating system price ! and the monopolists server operating system price
!M yields the rst order conditions:
11Enterprise servers are high-end corporate servers that manage vast amounts of mission critical data in
large corporations. They need very high levels of security and typically use custom written written software.
Web servers host the web-sites of companies and are also used for e-commerce.
12Our assumption greatly simplies the analysis of the monopolists problem. While the optimal software price
does depend on the expected prices for the hardware, we do not have to solve for the pricing policies of the
hardware producers to analyze relative margin e¤ect. If the software company would move rst setting prices
and the hardware company second, the software company would have to take into account the price reactions of
the hardware company.
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q + (!   c) @q
@!
+ (!M   cM )@qM
@!
= 0 (4)
qM + (!   c) @q
@!M
+ (!M   cM ) @qM
@!M
= 0 (5)
Denoting @q@!
1
q = "! as the semi-elasticity of the impact of a change in operating system price
(!) on quantity demanded (q), we can solve equations (4) and (5) for the PC monopolists prot
margins:
PC monopolists operating system margin:
(!   c) =   1
"!
0B@ 1  qMq "
M
!
"M!M
1  "!M"!
"M!
"M!M
1CA (6)
PC monopolists server operating system margin:
(!M   cM ) =   1
"M!M
0@ 1  qqM "!M"!
1  "!M"!
"M!
"M!M
1A (7)
There are four relevant semi-elasticities: the own-price elasticity of the operating systems of
PCs ("!), the own-price elasticity of the monopolists server operating system ("M!M ), the cross
price elasticity of the monopolists servers with respect to PC operating system prices ("M! )
and the cross price elasticity of PCs with respect to the monopolists server operating system
prices ("!M ). The semi-elasticities that determine the right hand side of these two equations
can be estimated from PC and server sales and price data. The operating systems margins
and the relative margin e¤ect can therefore be inferred from estimating the parameters of an
appropriate demand system.
A rst remark on equations (6) and (7) is that the price cost margins di¤er from the standard
single product monopoly margins due to the ratios of cross- to own-price elasticities of PC and
server operating system demands,
"!M
"!
and "
M
!
"M!M
. In general, mark-ups will be a¤ected both by
the degree of competition and by the degree of complementarity. As a benchmark case, suppose
that PCs and servers are perfect complements which means that customers buy servers and
PCs in xed proportions (i.e. exactly w PCs for every server purchased). With competition
between di¤erent server operating systems we should generally expect
"M!  < w"M!M : the
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demand response of the monopolists server operating system should be greater for an increase
in the server operating system price (!M ) than the PC operating system price (!), because
the latter leads to a price increase for all servers and therefore does not lead to substitution
between servers due to relative price changes. In the limit, as the server operating system market
becomes perfectly competitive, i.e. "M!M !  1 and "
M
!
"M!M
! 0, the PC operating system margin
of the monopolist goes to the single product monopoly margin, i.e. (! c)!   1"! . At the same
time the server operating system margin goes to zero, i.e. (!M   cM ) ! 0. Hence generally,
we would expect "
M
!
"M!M
to decrease as competition in the market for server operating systems
increases. A further implication of this discussion is that a naive estimation of PC operating
system margins that ignored the complementarity between PCs and servers (as the literature
typically does) will systematically generate incorrect results for estimated margins. Generally,
we would expect operating system margins to be over-stated by the failure to recognize this
complementarity. This could be why estimates of PC operating system margins on the basis
of elasticities appear to be much higher than their actual empirical values (e.g. Werden, 2001,
Schmalensee, 2000 and Reddy et al., 2001).
2.3. Measuring the Relative Output E¤ect. While the direct impact of a uniform
quality reduction of all rivals on demand can be deduced directly from the demand estimates,
the total output e¤ect needs to take into account the pricing reactions of rival server operating
system and hardware producers. To measure this indirect e¤ect of a quality change on relative
output we impose the assumption of prot maximizing behavior also for all rival software and
hardware companies. A server with lower quality will command lower prices in equilibrium.
Furthermore, if PC demand is reduced as a result of lower server qualities, PC hardware sellers
will also partly accommodate by reducing their prices in order to increase demand. These
equilibrium price adjustments are crucial to measure the size of the relative output e¤ect. We
therefore compute the equilibrium pricing response of each hardware and software producer
to a common change of quality in non-Microsoft servers given the estimated demand function
assuming a Nash equilibrium in prices. These price responses can then be used to compute
the relevant demand derivatives to determine the relative output e¤ect (see Appendix D for
details).
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To check the robustness of our results we also estimate reduced form equations for PC
server operating systems that depend only on quality indices and the estimated price cost
margins of the monopolist. The derivatives of this reduced form demand with respect to the
quality indices can then be used directly to calculate the relative output e¤ect. This approach
avoids the strong structural assumptions we have to make in the rst approach, but has more
ambiguities of interpretation. We show that the qualitative conclusions of the two approaches
are essentially the same (see Appendix F for details).
2.4. Implications of customer heterogeneity for incentives to degrade interoper-
abilty. In this sub-section we show how di¤erent types of heterogeneity map into foreclosure
incentives. The mechanisms that generate foreclosure incentives are all based on theories in
which competition in the server market interferes with a (privately) optimal price discrimi-
nation strategy by the PC monopolist. By foreclosing the server market, the monopolist can
increase rent extraction by using the price of the PC and server operating systems to target
di¤erent types of customers.
The sign of the relative margin e¤ect is determined by the sign of the server margin in
equation (7), which in turn depends only on:
1  q
qM
"!M
"!
=   1
"!
Z 
q(; w)
q
  qM (; w)
qM

["!   "!(; w)] dP ()d(w) (8)
where the aggregate elasticity of demand(i.e. across all consumers) is "! =
R
"!(; w)dP ()d(w)
and P () and (w) are the population distribution functions of  and w.13 It follows that the
server operating system margin will be positive if the own price semi-elasticity of the PC oper-
ating system,  "!; is positively correlated with

q(;w)
q   qM (;w)qM

. This means that on average
buyers with relatively more elastic PC demand (a more negative "! than "!) have higher market
shares in PC purchases than in server purchases from the monopolist. It follows that the server
margin will be zero if there is no heterogeneity - the monopolist does best by setting the price
of the server at marginal cost and extracting all surplus through the PC operating system price.
In this case there is no incentive to foreclose rival servers because all rent can be extracted
through the PC price:
13The derivation of (8) can be found in Appendix A.2, equation (31).
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Proposition 1. If there is no demand heterogeneity in the parameter vector (; w), then the
one monopoly prot theory holds. The PC operating system monopolist sells the server
operating system at marginal cost and extracts all rents with the PC price. The monopolist
has no incentive to degrade interoperability.
Proof. See Appendix A.3
In order to generate foreclosure incentives the optimal extraction of surplus for the monop-
olist involves making a margin on the server product. In that case, competition among server
operating systems reduces the margin that can be earned on servers and thus restricts the abil-
ity of the PC monopolist to extract monopoly rents. By limiting interoperability, rival server
quality is reduced and the monopolist restoresa server margin.
Foreclosure incentives require sorting customers with inelastic PC demand into buying the
monopolists server operating system, and customers with more elastic PC demand into not
buying the server. Our central model generates this feature by assuming customers do not
necessarily need to buy a server in order to gain value from PCs. By contrast, servers are
complements to PCs in the sense that they only have value when they are consumed with PCs.
We call this the imperfect complementarity case.14
To see this, consider a limited type of heterogeneity where buyers have di¤erent marginal
valuations of server quality i, which can be either  or 0. Server quality is denoted yk. We
also assume that there is no other heterogeneity across consumers with respect to the server
product and without loss of generality assume only one brand of PC and one brand of server
with the monopolists server operating system. Given this we can prove:
Proposition 2. Suppose that i 2 f0; g. Then the monopolist sets the server operating
system price strictly above marginal cost. Then there exists yk > yM , such that for all yk 2
(yM ; yk) it is optimal for the monopolist to foreclose a competitor by fully degrading the quality
of a competing server operating system.
Proof. See Appendix A.3
14We also consider a more general case of free complementaryin section 5.3, where servers can be purchased
stand alone.
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Proposition 2 states that when the monopolist has a server margin, for some values of rival
server quality above the monopolists server quality (yk > yM ), the monopolist will degrade
rival quality. The positive value of the server margin follows from equation (8). Although all
groups have positive PC sales, the server market share of customers with high value for the
server (i = ) is 1 whereas that of customers with low value (i = 0) is zero. This means that
there is a positive correlation between the elasticity of demand of the type  and the relative
importance of that type in PC sales.
Now consider competition on the server operating system market. By standard Bertrand
arguments, competition between the two server products will compete down the price of the
lower quality product to no more than marginal cost, and the higher quality rm can extract
(at most) the additional value provided by its higher quality. If the rival server does not have
too much higher quality it will extract all of the quality improvement over the monopolists
product in the server price. This means that a PC monopolist with the lower quality server
will generate the same prot as setting the server price at marginal cost without competition
and setting the conditionally optimal PC price. Fully foreclosing the competitor is therefore
optimal even if the competitor has arbitrarily better quality than the monopolist. Note also
that for a rival rm with lower server quality the monopolist cannot extract the full value of
its own server quality but only the improvement over the quality of the rival. Hence, reducing
the quality of the rival slightly will increase the ability to extract surplus.
Proposition 2 holds because competition limits the ability of the PC operating system mo-
nopolist to optimally extract surplus. If customers with high elasticity of PC demand sort away
from servers, then server sales can be used as a second degree price discrimination device, allow-
ing the monopolist to extract more surplus from high server value/low elasticity customers.15
15Note that even where this foreclosure e¤ect exists, it is not always the case that there are marginal incentives
to foreclose. For example in the above model there are no marginal incentives to foreclose when the rival has
higher quality. A small reduction in the quality has no e¤ect on the prots of the monopolist in that case. Only
a reduction below the quality of the incumbent will increase prots. In more general models there can even
be a negative marginal incentive to foreclose when there are global incentives to foreclose. This arises from a
vertical product di¤erentiation e¤ect. Locally a small increase in the quality of a higher quality rival can lead to
higher prots for the monopolist by relaxing price competition as in a Shaked and Sutton (1992) style product
di¤erentiation model. Nevertheless, there may be incentives to dramatically reduce quality of the rival in order
to increase prots even further. Our focus in the empirical analysis of the marginal incentives to foreclose may
therefore lead to an underestimation of the true foreclosure incentives.
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3. Econometric Strategy
3.1. The Model of Demand. The previous section showed the key theoretical mechanisms
at play. We now turn to how we econometrically model the problem by considering individual
demand as a discrete choice of workgrouppurchases. A buyer i of type w has demand for
a PC workgroup which consists of w PCs and one server. We assume that each buyer can
connect his workgroup to at most one server.16 As before, there are J producers of PCs and
K producers of servers indexed by j and k respectively.17 The index j = 0 refers to a purchase
that does not include PCs while k = 0 refers to an option that does not include a server. A
buyer i with workgroup size w who buys the PCs from producer j and the server from producer
k has conditional indirect utility:
uijk(wi) = wi

xji + akyki   i[pj +
1
wi
pk] + j + k + jk + ijk

(9)
The total price for the workgroup is given by wipj + pk18 and the income sensitivity of utility
of buyer i is measured by i. The characteristics of PC j are captured by the vector xj and the
characteristics of server hardware software k are represented by the vector yk. The vectors i
and i represent the marginal value of these characteristics to buyer i. We normalize quality by
assuming that the interoperability parameter a = 1 whenever server producer k has the Windows
operating system installed. We assume that ak = a  1 is the same for all non-Microsoft servers.
In the case of j = 0, (xj ; pj) is the null vector, while in the case of k = 0, (yk; pk) is the null
vector. These represent workgrouppurchase without a server or without PCs respectively.
The models we estimate di¤er in whether these choices are allowed, which captures di¤erent
16Assuming that the purchase decisions are only about the setup of a whole workgroupimplies some impor-
tant abstractions from reality. If server systems are used for serving one workgroup we e¤ectively assume that
the whole system is scalable by the factor 1=w. E¤ectively, we are capturing all potential e¤ects of pre-existing
stocks of servers and PCs (together with their operating systems) by the distribution of ijk in equation (8). Since
we are assuming that this distribution is invariant over time, we are implicitly assuming that (modulo some time
trend) the distribution of stocks of computers is essentially invariant. Also note that scalability of workgroups
implies that we are not allowing for any di¤erence in rm size directly. All such di¤erences will be incorporated
into the distribution of the ijk and the parameters (i; i; i) including a (heterogenous) constant. The idea is
to make the relationship between size and purchases as little dependent on functional form as possible.
17For notationally simplicity we are associating one producer with one PC or server hardware type. In the
empirical work we, of course, allow for multi-product rms.
18We can allow for two part tari¤s by having pk take the form pk(w) = pk1 +wpk2. This can allow for typical
pricing structures in which there is a xed price for the server operating system and a pricing component based on
the number of users (i.e. w Client Access Licenceshave to be purchased). We can accommodate such pricing
without any problems in our approach. All that is really important for the pricing structure is that there is some
xed component to the pricing of the monopolists server operating system. For simplicity we will exposit all of
the analysis below ignoring licenses based on client user numbers.
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assumptions about the degree of complementarity. The terms j and k represent unobserved
quality characteristics of the PC and server respectively, while jk represents an interaction
e¤ect between a specic PC and server type.
The term ijk represents a buyer specic shock to utility for the particular workgroup se-
lected. Assumptions on the distribution of this term among customers will model the degree of
horizontal product di¤erentiation between di¤erent workgroup o¤erings. Given that we make
ijk workgroup specic, the variables jk and ijk capture all of the potential complementarities
between the PCs and the servers in a workgroup. In the empirical section we generally assume
that jk = 0 except for one model version in which jk is a common shift variable for utility
whenever a buyer consumes PCs and servers together.
Following BLP, we allow random coe¢ cients on the parameter vector i = (i; i; i) as
well as heterogeneity in the size of work groups wi (captured by a random coe¢ cient on the
server price, Si  i=wi).19 We derive demand from the above utility function in the standard
way (see Appendix A), the key assumptions being that ijk comes from a double exponential
distribution and that (i; wi) are drawn from a multivariate normal distribution.20 We can then
calculate market shares, sij for buyer i of PC j as:
sij = e
j+ij
KX
k=0
ek+ik
1 +
PJ
j=1
PK
k=0 e
j+ij+k+ik
(10)
and for servers as:
sik = e
k+ik
JX
j=1
ej+ij
1 +
PJ
j=1
PK
k=0 e
j+ij+k+ik
(11)
where the mean utilities are:
j = xj   PCpj + PCj ; k = akyk   Spk + Sk (12)
19Hence, the ratio of the estimated price coe¢ cients of PCsto serverscan provide us with an estimate of the
implied workgroup size.
20Although the multivariate normal is the most popular choice (e.g. BLP; Nevo, 2001), other possibilities
have also been explored (e.g., Petrin, 2002). One could object to the assumption that wi is normally distributed
because strictly speaking it is a count data process (the number of PCs is a positive integer). However, a typical
workgroup contains a large number of PC clients (see data section), so viewing i=wi as distributed normally
seems like a reasonable approximation.
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and the individual e¤ectsare:
ij = 
PCxj
PC
i + 
PC
p pj
PC
ip ; ik = 
Syk
S
i + 
S
p pk
S
ip
The (PCi ; 
PC
ip ; 
S
i ; 
S
ip) is a vector of the normalized individual e¤ects on the parameters and
(PC ; PCp ; 
S ; Sp ) is the vector of standard deviations of these e¤ects in the population. Notice
that the individual e¤ects, ij and ik, depend on the interaction of customer specic preferences
and product characteristics.21
3.2. Baseline Imperfect Complementarity Model. Our baseline imperfect complemen-
tarity demand model can be empirically implemented in the standard fashion of BLP demand
models. We allow customers to select either w PCs or a workgroupof w PCs and one server.
The indirect utility of the outside option is ui00 = PC0 + 
S
0 + 
PC
0 
PC
i0 + 
S
0 
S
i0 + i00, where
the price of the outside good is normalized to zero. Since relative levels of utility cannot be
identied, the mean utility of one good has to be normalized to zero so we set 0 = 0. The
terms in i0 accounts for the outside alternativesunobserved variance.
To connect the empirical framework with the theoretical model, we model the interoperabil-
ity parameter (a) as a multiplicative e¤ect that customers derive from having a Microsoft (M)
server:
k = yk1 + 2M + 3(Myk)  Spk + k (13)
where M is a dummy variable equal to one if the server runs a Microsoft operating system and
zero otherwise. In this way, the interoperability parameter is captured by a combination of the
estimated coe¢ cients and therefore we can calculate the relative output e¤ect in one step
(see Appendix D for details). Given this parameterization, the relationship between the mean
utility for servers in equation (12) and the estimates is that 3 = (1  a) and 1 = a, where
0  a  1 is the interoperability parameter.22 If there were no interoperability limitations
21Hence, our modelling approach is to x the random draws on the heterogeneity of consumerspreferences
and to compare the results of di¤erent assumptions on the strength of the complementarity between servers and
PCs (imperfect complementarity vs. free complementarity). An alternative approach would have been to allow
consumers to have some correlation in their preferences across PCs and servers as well as an idiosyncratic draw
that could directly be estimated from the data. The aggregate nature of our data did not allow us to estimate
such more exible models.
22We allow 2 to be freely estimated as it could reect the higher (or lower) quality of Windows compared
to other operating systems. Alternatively, 2 could also reect interoperability limitations. We examine this
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between Microsoft and non-Microsoft operating systems (a = 1), then 3, the coe¢ cient on the
interaction variable in equation (13), would be estimated as zero.
3.3. Estimation. Our estimation strategy closely follows the spirit of the BLP estimation
algorithm, but modies it so that multiple product categories(i.e. PCs and servers) can be
accommodated. In essence, the algorithm minimizes a nonlinear GMM function that is the
product of instrumental variables and a structural error term. This error term, dened as the
unobserved product characteristics,  = (PCj ; 
S
k ), is obtained through the inversion of the
market share equations after aggregating appropriately the individual customers preferences.
However, the presence of multiple product categories means that we need to compute the
unobserved term, , via a category-by-category contraction mapping procedure (for a detailed
description of the algorithm followed see Appendix C).
Implementing the contraction mapping for PCs and servers is consistent with BLP, but a
concern is that feedback loops between the two categories could alter the parameter estimates.
There is no theoretical proof we know of for a contraction mapping for random coe¢ cient models
with complements, but we made two empirical checks on the results involving further iterations
of the algorithm across the two product categories. These both lead to very similar results to
the ones presented here (see discussion in Appendix C).
The weighting matrix in the GMM function was computed using a two-step procedure. To
minimize the GMM function we used both the Nelder-Mead nonderivative search method and
the faster Quasi-Newton gradient method based on an analytic gradient.23 We combine all these
methods to verify that we reached a global instead of a local minimum.
Standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity are calculated taking into consideration the
additional variance introduced by the simulation.24 In our benchmark specication we draw a
sample of 150 customers, but we also experiment with more draws in our robustness section.
Condence intervals for nonlinear functions of the parameters (e.g., relative output and relative
possibility in a robustness exercise.
23 In all contraction mappings, we dened a strict tolerance level: for the rst hundred iterations the tolerance
level is set to 10E-8, while after every 50 iterations the tolerance level increases by an order of ten.
24We do not correct for correlation in the disturbance term of a given model across time because it turns out
to be very small.Two features of our approach appear to account for this nding: First, rm xed e¤ects are
included in the estimation. Second, there is a high turnover of products, with each brand model observation
having a very short lifecycle compared to other durables like autos.
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margin e¤ects) were computed by using a parametric bootstrap. We drew repeatedly (2,000
draws) from the estimated joint distribution of parameters. For each draw we computed the
desired quantity, thus generating a bootstrap distribution.
3.4. Identication and instrumental variables. Identication of the population mo-
ment condition is based on an assumption and a vector of instrumental variables. Following
BLP we assume that the unobserved product level errors are uncorrelated with the observed
product characteristics. In other words, that the location of products in the characteristics
space is exogenous. In our view, this is realistic for both the PC and server manufacturers
since most R&D and components built are developed and produced by other rms, not the
PC or server manufacturers themselves. Given this exogeneity assumption, characteristics of
other products will be correlated with price, since the markup for each model will depend on
the distance from its nearest competitors. To be precise, for both PCs and servers we use the
number of products produced by the rm and the number produced by its rivals, as well as the
sum of various characteristics (PCs: speed, RAM, hard drive; servers: RAM, whether the server
is rack optimized, number of racks, number of models running Unix) of own and rival models.
One of the many contributions of Gandhi and Houde (2015) is the insight that the power of
the instruments can be signicantly improved by choosing a sub-set of close characteristics
of rival products. Following this idea, we also constructed all instruments in the PC equation
separately for desktops and laptops.25
As emphasized by the important contribution of Berry and Haile (2014), we also examine
the robustness of our results by varying the type of instruments used. First, we experimented
using alternative combinations of computer characteristics. Second, we use hedonic price series
of computer inputs, such as semi-conductor chips, which are classic cost shifters. The results
are robust to these two alternative sets of instruments, but they were less powerful in the rst
stage. Finally, we followed Hausman (1996) and Hausman et al (1994) and used model-level
prices in other countries (such as Canada, Europe or Japan) as alternative instruments. These
instruments were powerful in the rst stage, but there was evidence from the diagnostic tests
that they were invalid (see Genakos, 2004 and Van Reenen, 2004, for more discussion).
25See also Bresnahan, Stern and Trajtenbergs (1997) study of the PC market.
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Finally, one important limitation of using aggregate data is that we cannot separate true
complementarity (or substitutability) of goods from correlation in customerspreferences (see
Gentzkow, 2007). Observing that rms that buy PCs also buy servers might be evidence that
the two product categories in question are complementary. It might also reect the fact that
unobservable tastes for the goods are correlated - that some rms just have a greater need for
computing power. However, notice that for our purposes such a distinction does not make a
major di¤erence to the theoretical results - so long as there is a correlation between customers
heterogeneous preferences for PCs and their probability of buying servers, the incentive to
foreclose can exist.
4. Data
Quarterly data on quantities and prices between 1996Q1 and 2001Q1 was taken from the PC
Quarterly Tracker and the Server Quarterly Tracker, two industry censuses conducted by Inter-
national Data Corporation (IDC). The Trackers gather information from the major hardware
vendors, component manufacturers and various channel distributors and contains information
on model-level revenues and transaction prices.26 The information on computer characteris-
tics is somewhat limited in IDC, so we matched more detailed PC and server characteristics
from several industry datasources and trade magazines. We concentrate on the top fourteen
computer hardware producers with sales to large businesses (over 500 employees) in the US
market to match each observation with more detailed product characteristics.27 We focus on
large businesses as these are the main customers who clearly face a choice to use servers (see
Genakos, 2004, for an analysis of other consumer segments).
For PCs the unit of observation is distinguished into form factor (desktop vs. laptop),
vendor (e.g. Dell), model (e.g. Optiplex), processor type (e.g. Pentium II) and processor speed
(e.g. 266 MHZ) specic. In terms of characteristics we also know RAM (memory), monitor size
and whether there was a CD-ROM or Ethernet card included. A key PC characteristic is the
performance benchmarkwhich is a score assigned to each processor-speed combination based
26Various datasets from IDC have been used in the literature (Davis and Huse, 2009; Foncel and Ivaldi, 2005;
Van Reenen, 2006; Pakes, 2003; Genakos, 2004).
27These manufacturers (in alphabetical order) are: Acer, Compaq, Dell, Digital, Fujitsu, Gateway, Hewlett-
Packard, IBM, NEC, Packard Bell, Sony, Sun, Tandem and Toshiba. Apple was excluded due to the fact that
we were unable to match more detail characteristics in the way its processors were recorded by IDC.
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on technical and performance characteristics.
Similarly, for servers a unit of observation is dened as a manufacturer and family/model-
type. We also distinguish by operating system, since (unlike PCs) many servers run non-
Windows operating systems (we distinguish six other categories: Netware, Unix, Linux, VMS,
OS390/400 and a residual category). For servers key characteristics are also RAM, the number
of rack slots,28 whether the server was rack optimized (racks were an innovation that enhanced
server exibility), motherboard type (e.g. Symmetric Parallel Processing - SMP), and chip type
(CISC, RISC or IA32). Appendix B contains more details on the construction of our datasets.
Potential market size is tied down by assuming that rms will not buy more than one new
PC for every worker per year. The total number of employees in large businesses is taken from
the US Bureau of Labour Statistics. Results based on di¤erent assumptions about the potential
market size are also reported.
Table A1 provides sales weighted means of the basic variables for PCs that are used in
the specications below. These variables include quantity (in actual units), price (in $1,000),
benchmark (in units of 1,000), memory (in units of 100MB) as well as identiers for desktop,
CD-ROM and Ethernet card. Similarly, Table A2 provides sales weighted means of the basic
variables that are used for servers. These variables include quantity (in actual units), price (in
$1,000), memory (in units of 100MB), as well as identiers for rack optimized, motherboard
type, each operating system used and number of racks. The choice of variables was guided by
technological innovation taking place during the late 1990s, but also developments and trends
in related markets (e.g. Ethernet for internet use or CD-ROM for multimedia).
Table A1 shows that there was a remarkable pace of quality improvement over this time
period. Core computer characteristics have improved dramatically exhibiting average quarterly
growth of 12% for benchmarkand RAM. New components such as the Ethernet cards that
were installed in only 19% of new PCs at the start of the period were standard in 52% of
PCs by 2001. CD-ROM were installed in 80% of new PCs in 1996 but were ubiquitous in 2001.
Furthermore, technological progress is accompanied by rapidly falling prices. The sales-weighted
average price of PCs fell by 40% over our sample period (from $2,550 to under $1,500).29
28Rack mounted servers were designed to t into 19 inch racks. They allow multiple machines to be clustered
or managed in a single location and enhance scalability.
29There is an extensive empirical literature using hedonic regressions that documents the dramatic declines in
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Similar trends hold for the server market. Core characteristics, such as RAM, exhibit an
average quarterly growth of 12% over the sample period, the proportion of servers using rack-
optimization rose from practically zero at the start of the period to 40% by the end. The average
price of servers fell by half during the same period (from $13,523 to $6,471). More importantly,
for our purposes, is the dramatic rise of Windows on the server from 20% at the start of the
sample to 57% by the end. As also seen in Figure 1, this increase in Windowsmarket share
comes mainly from the decline of Novells Netware (down from 38% at the start of the sample
to 14% by the end) and, to a lesser extent of the various avors of Unix (down from 24% to
18%). The only other operating system to have grown is open source Linux, although at the
end of the period it had under 10% of the market.30
5. Results
5.1. Main Results. We rst turn to the demand estimates from a simple logit model (Table
1 for PCs and Table 2 for servers) and the full random coe¢ cients model (Table 3), before
discussing their implications in terms of the theoretical model. The simple logit model (i.e.
ij = ik = 0) is used to examine the importance of instrumenting the price and to test
the di¤erent sets of instrumental variables discussed in the previous section for each product
category separately. Table 1 reports the results for PCs obtained from regressing ln(sjt) ln(s0t)
on prices, brand characteristics and manufacturer identiers. The rst two columns include a
full set of time xed e¤ects, whereas the last four columns include only a time trend (a restriction
that is not statistically rejected). Column (1) reports OLS results: the coe¢ cient on price is
negative and signicant as expected, but rather small in magnitude. Many coe¢ cients have their
expected signs - more recent generations of chips are highly valued as is an Ethernet card or
CD-ROM drive. But a key performance metric, RAM, has a negative and signicant coe¢ cient,
although the other quality measure, performance benchmark, has the expected positive and
signicant coe¢ cient. Furthermore, the nal row of Table 1 shows that the vast majority of
products (85.5%) are predicted to have inelastic demands, which is clearly unsatisfactory.
the quality adjusted price of personal computers. See, for example, Berndt and Rappaport (2001) and Pakes
(2003).
30Even Linuxs limited success, despite being o¤ered at a zero price, is mainly conned to server functions
at the edge of the workgroup such as web-serving rather than the core workgroup task of le and print and
directory services (see European Commission, 2004, for more discussion). Web servers have been considered
outside the relevant market in the European Commission decision.
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Column (2) of Table 1 uses sums of the number of products and their observed characteristics
o¤ered by each rm and its rivals as instrumental variables. Treating price as endogenous
greatly improves the model - the coe¢ cient on price becomes much more negative and most
other coe¢ cients have now the expected signs.31 Most importantly, under 1% of models now
have inelastic demands. Columns (3) and (4) report the same comparison between the OLS
and IV results when we include a time trend instead of a full set of time dummies. Again, as
we move from OLS to IV results, the coe¢ cient on price becomes much more negative leaving
no products with inelastic demands and all the other coe¢ cients on PC characteristics have
the expected sign. For example, both benchmark and RAM have now positive and signicant
coe¢ cients and virtually all products have now elastic demands. In terms of diagnostics, the
rst stage results (reported in full in Table A3) indicate that the instruments have power: the
F-statistic of the joint signicance of the excluded instruments is 9 in column (2) and 27 in
column (4). In the last two columns we restrict the number of instruments dropping hard
disks in column (3) and also speed in column (4). Focusing on a sub-set of the more powerful
instruments further improves our results. In the last column, for example, the rst stage F-test
is 41, moving the price coe¢ cient further away from zero, leaving no PC with inelastic demand.
Table 2 reports similar results from the simple logit model for the server data. In columns
(1) and (2) the OLS and IV results are again reported based on regressions that include a full set
of time xed e¤ects, whereas the latter four columns include instead a time trend (a statistically
acceptable restriction). The price terms are signicant, but with a much lower point estimate
than PCs. Consistent with the PC results, the coe¢ cient on server price falls substantially
moving from OLS to IV (e.g. from -0.040 in column (3) to -0.179 in column (4)).
Columns (4)-(6) of Table 2 experiment with di¤erent instrument sets (rst stages are re-
ported in full in Table A4). Empirically, the most powerful set of instruments were the number
of models by the rm, the number of models produced by rivals rms and the sum of RAM by
rivals (used in columns (2) and (6)). We use these instruments in all columns and also include
the o¢ cial series for quality-adjusted prices for semi-conductors and for hard-disks (two key
inputs for servers) in columns (4) and (5). In addition, column (5) includes sums of rivalschar-
31The only exception is monitor size which we would expect to have a positive coe¢ cient whereas it has a small
negative coe¢ cient. This is likely to arise from the introduction of more advanced and thinner monitors of the
same size introduced in 1999-2001. These are not recorded separately in the data.
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acteristics (rack-optimized servers, numbers of racks and use of Unix). Although the parameter
estimates are reasonably stable across the experiments, the F-test of excluded instruments in-
dicates that the parsimonious IV set of column (6) is preferred, with a F-statistic of 12.9. In
these preferred estimates we nd that RAM, the number of racks (an indicator of scalability)
and type of chip appear to be signicantly highly valued by customers. Most importantly, the
estimated proportion of inelastic model demands in the nal row falls from over 80% in column
(3) to 22% in column (6). Notice also that the coe¢ cient on the interaction of Windows and
RAM is always positive and signicant in the IV results which is consistent with the idea of
some interoperability constraints.32
A sense-check on the results is to use the fact that the implied workgroup size (the number
of PCs per server) can be estimated from the ratio of the price coe¢ cients in the PC equation to
those in the server equations. In the IV specications, the implied workgroup size ranges from
10.6 in column (9) to 18.9 in column (2) which are plausible sizes of workgroups (e.g. Euro-
pean Commission, 2004; International Data Corporation, 1998). Our estimates of PC hardware
brand-level elasticities are within the typical range of those estimated in the literature, but
are relatively inelastic probably because we focus on large rms rather than on households.33
One diagnostic problem is that the Hansen-Sargan test of over-identication restrictions reject
throughout Tables 1 and 2, a common problem in this literature. There is some improve-
ment as we move to the preferred more parsimonious specications, but it is a concern for the
instruments.
Results from the baseline random coe¢ cients model are reported in column (1) of Table 3.
The rst two panels (A and B) report the mean coe¢ cients for PCs and servers respectively.
Almost all mean coe¢ cients are signicant and have the expected sign. The lower rows (C and
D) report the results for the random coe¢ cients. We allow random coe¢ cients only on price
and one other basic characteristic in our baseline specication - performance benchmark for PCs
and RAM for servers.34 Our results indicate that there is signicant heterogeneity in the price
32We also estimated models allowing other server characteristics to interact with the Microsoft dummy. These
produced similar evidence that these characteristics were less highly valued when used with a non-Microsoft
server. The other interactions were not signicant, however, so we use the RAM interaction as our preferred
specication.
33For various estimates of computer demand elastcities see Foncel and Ivaldi (2005), Goeree (2008), Hendel
(1999), Ivaldi and Lorincz (2008) or Stavins (1997).
34We also estimated models allowing a random coe¢ cient on the interaction of RAM with Microsoft. This was
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coe¢ cient for PCs and servers. For PCs, the random coe¢ cient for the performance benchmark
has a large value and although insignicant in column (1) is signicantly di¤erent from zero in
the other columns (see below). The robust nding of heterogeneity in the PC price coe¢ cient
is important for our theory as this drives the desire to price discriminate which, according to
the model, underlies the incentive to foreclose the server market.
As a cross-check on the plausibility of the estimates it is important that the implied hardware
margins from the baseline model seem realistic for both PCs and servers. Assuming multi-
product rms and Nash-Bertrand competition in prices for PC and server hardware rms, our
derived median margin is 16% for PCs and 34% for servers. This is in line with industry
reports at the time that put the gross prot margins of the main PC manufacturers in the
range of 10%-20% and for server vendors in the range of 25%-54%.35 Furthermore, the implied
mean workgroup size of 10.2 (the ratio of the mean coe¢ cients on PC vs. server prices) is also
reasonable.
Figure 2 plots the calculated relative output and operating system margin e¤ects based on
these coe¢ cients (together with the 90% condence interval).36 Server operating system margins
are higher than PC operating system margins (as indicated by relative margins well in excess of
unity). Note that the operating system margin di¤erences are similar to some crude industry
estimates.37 The higher margin on servers than PC operating systems reects both greater
customer sensitivity to PC prices, but more interestingly the nding that there is signicant
heterogeneity in the e¤ects of price on demand across customers. According to proposition 2
this heterogeneity creates incentives for the PC monopolist to use the server market as a price
discrimination device by charging a positive server margin. The positive value of the relative
output e¤ect indicates that reducing interoperability has a cost to Microsoft which is the loss of
PC demand (due to complementarity). The shaded area in Figure 2 indicates where we estimate
insignicant and the implied overall e¤ects were similar so we keep to the simpler formulation here.
35See International Data Corporation (1999a,b). The numbers are also consistent with other results in the
literature. For example, Goeree (2008), using a di¤erent quarterly US data set for 1996-1998, reports a median
margin of 19% for PCs from her preferred model, whereas ours is 16%.
36Figure A1 in the Appendix plots the calculated relative output and margin e¤ects together with the 95%
condence interval.
37Large businesses will enjoy more discounts than individuals, so we cannot simply look at list prices. IDC
(1999, Table 1) estimate server operating environment revenues for Windows as $1,390m million and license
shipments for Windows NT were as 1,814 (Table 4). This implies a transaction price for a Windows server
operating system (including CALs) as $766. Similar caluclations for PC operating systems are around $40,
suggesting a relative margin 19 to 1 similar to Figure 1.
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that Microsoft has signicant incentives to degrade interoperability.
Four key ndings stand out in Figure 2. First, looking at the period as a whole, the relative
margin e¤ect exceeds the output e¤ect from the end of 1996 onwards indicating incentives to
degrade interoperability. Second, the two e¤ects trend in opposite directions with the relative
output e¤ect decreasing and the relative margin steadily increasing. By the end of our sample
period in 2001, the di¤erence between the two e¤ects takes its largest value with the relative
margin e¤ect clearly dominating the relative output e¤ect. Third, the two lines diverge around
the end of 1999 and beginning of 2000. These dates coincide with the release of the new
Microsoft operating system (Windows 2000). The European anti-trust case hinged precisely
on industry reports that Windows 2000 contained interoperability limitations that were much
more severe than any previous version on Windows (European Commission, 2004). Fourth,
the relative output e¤ect is very small and very close to zero from 1999 onwards. This means
that foreclosure inducing activities would have had cost Microsoft very little in terms of lost
PC operating system sales. As we will show later these four ndings are robust to alternative
empirical models of complementarity and a battery of robustness tests.
The increase in the relative server-PC margin is mainly driven by the increase in the absolute
value of the PC own price elasticity. This is likely to be caused by the increasing commodica-
tionof PCs over this time period linked to the increasing entry of large numbers of PC brands
by low cost manufacturers (e.g. Dell and Acer) as the industry matured and cheaper produc-
tion sites in Asia became available. The relative output e¤ect is declining primarily because
the aggregate number of servers sold was rising faster than the number of PCs, which is related
to the move away from mainframes to client-server computing (see Bresnahan and Greenstein,
1999). Thus, a marginal change in interoperabilty had a smaller e¤ect on loss of PC quantity
(relative to the gain in servers) in 2001 than in 1996.
5.2. Robustness. Columns (2)-(8) of Table 3 report various robustness tests of the baseline
model (reproduced in Figure 3A to ease comparisons) to gauge the sensitivity of the results to
changes in our assumptions. We show that the basic qualitative result that there were incentives
to degrade interoperability is robust. First, we vary the number of random draws following the
Monte Carlo evidence from Berry, Linton and Pakes (2004) for the BLP model. In column (2)
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we increase the number of draws to 500 (from 150 in the baseline model). The estimated results
are very similar to our baseline specication, the only exception being that the PC benchmark
now has a signicant random coe¢ cient. Unsurprisingly, the calculated relative output and
margin e¤ects in Figure 3B exhibit the same pattern as in Figure 3A.
In column (3) and (4) of Table 3 we make di¤erent assumptions about the potential market
size. In column (3) we assume that rms will only make a purchase decision to give all employees
a computer every two years, essentially reducing the potential market size by half. In column
(4) we assume that the potential market size is asymmetric, whereby rms purchase a PC every
year whereas they purchase a server bundle every two years. In both experiments the estimated
coe¢ cients are hardly changed and Figures 3C and 3D are similar.
In columns (5) and (6) of Table 3 we reduce the number of instruments used for both the
PCs and servers. On the one hand, using the most powerful instruments increases the absolute
value of the coe¢ cients. For example, the mean coe¢ cient on PC price increases from -3.301 in
the baseline model to -3.622 and -5.598 in columns (5) and (6) respectively. On the other hand,
using fewer instruments means that we are reducing the number of identifying restrictions and
this is reected in higher standard errors. As a result very few coe¢ cients are signicant in
column (6). Despite these di¤erences, Figures 3E and 3F reveal a qualitative similar picture as
before.
In columns (7) and (8) of Table 3 we experiment using di¤erent random coe¢ cients. In
column (7), we add a random coe¢ cient on the constant in both equations. The estimated
coe¢ cients indicate no signicant heterogeneity for the outside good at the 5% level for either
PCs or servers. In column (8) we reduce the number of estimated random coe¢ cients by
allowing only a random coe¢ cient on server price. As before, both the estimated coe¢ cients
and calculated e¤ects in Figures 3G and 3H look similar to our baseline specication: at the
beginning of our sample the relative output e¤ect dominates the relative margin e¤ect, but by
the end of 2000 the ordering is clearly reversed indicating strong incentives from Microsofts
perspective to reduce interoperability.
5.3. Free complementarity model. Our baseline model is more restrictive in that comple-
mentarity between PCs and servers is built in rather than estimated, as customers are assumed
25
to buy either a PC, a bundle of a server and PC or the outside good. This choice was driven
both by our understanding of how the market for workgrouppurchases operates (rms buy
servers not to use them on a stand alone basis but to coordinate and organize PCs). However,
we also analyze a more general model that allows the data to determine the degree of comple-
mentarity or substitutability between the two products that we call the free complementarity
model.
Under the free complementarity model a bundle, indicated by (j; k), can include either a
server, or a workgroup of PCs, or both. Denote dPC as an indicator variable that takes the value
of one if any PC is purchased and zero otherwise; similarly we dene dS to be the indicator for
servers. Each customer i, maximizes utility by choosing at each point in time, t, the bundle of
products, (j; k), with the highest utility, where utility is given by:
uijk = j + ij + k + ik +  (d
PC ; dS) + ijk (14)
This is identical to the baseline except we have included an additional term,  (dPC ; dS), that
it is not a¤ected by a choice of particular brand once (dPC ; dS) is given and does not vary
across customers. This utility structure allows us to model complementarity or substitution at
the level of the good, i.e. PC or server, via a "free" parameter,  PC;S , that captures the extra
utility that a customer obtains from consuming these two products together over and above
the utility derived from each product independently. When  PC;S is positive we call PCs and
servers complements (and if negative substitutes). This model borrows directly from the work of
Gentzkow (2007), who was the rst to introduce a similar parameter in a discrete setting. Our
utility model is more general in that we allow for random coe¢ cients on the model characteristics
and prices (Gentzkow does not have price variation in his data). More importantly, our model
is designed to be estimated with aggregate market level data. We identify the  PC;S parameter
in the standard way, by using aggregate time series variation in server prices (in the PC demand
equation) and time series variation in PCs prices (in the server demand equation).38 Further
38Song and Chintagunta (2006) also build on Gentzkow to allow for a common complementarity/substitution
parameter and apply it on store level data for detergents and softeners. We di¤er from Song and Chintagunta
in three ways: (i) we specify a di¤erent brand and consumer part of the utility that is closer to the original
BLP specication, (ii) we use a di¤erent set of instruments to address the issue of price endogeneity and (iii) we
implement a more robust estimation method.
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model and estimation details are given in Appendix E.
The free complementarity model is presented in the last column of Table 3 where we
allow customers to purchase standalone servers (as well as standalone PCs, bundles of PCs
and servers or the outside good), and let complementarity to be freely estimated through the
parameter  PC;S . The estimated  PC;S parameter is positive and signicant, conrming our
previous assumption and intuition that PCs and servers are complements. The mean and
random coe¢ cients all exhibit similar patterns to the baseline results with evidence of signicant
heterogeneity in price (for servers and PCs) and signicant heterogeneity in customersvaluation
of PC quality (benchmark) but not server quality (RAM). Figure 4 plots the relative output
and margin e¤ects and their condence interval. The relative margin is somewhat lower than
under the baseline model of column (1). This is because second degree price discrimination is
less powerful because customers who buy servers now come from a group with both low PC
demand elasticity and no demand for PCs at all. Nevertheless, we still nd incentives to degrade
interoperability towards the end of the sample period. Relative output e¤ects remain small.
Given that this is a much more demanding specication, the consistency of results with our
baseline case is reassuring.39
So far, to measure the relative output e¤ect we relied heavily on our structural demand
model to compute the equilibrium pricing response of each hardware and software producer
to a common change of quality in non-Microsoft servers. As a nal robustness test we also
consider an alternative approach to estimating the relative output e¤ect, which considers only
the reduced formresidual demand equations for Microsoft servers and PCs. Since these will
be a function of non-Microsoft quality (and other variables), we can use the coe¢ cients on these
to calculate the output e¤ects of degradation directly. Appendix F gives the details and shows
that relative margins continue to lie far above the relative output e¤ect. The relative output
e¤ect is 4 or less, far below the mean relative margin estimated at around 20 in Figure 2. So
even this simpler, less structural approach, suggests strong incentives for Microsoft to reduce
interoperability.
39The reason why we do not use this model as our baseline is because estimation of the free complementarity
was signicantly slower to converge and more sensitive to starting values (causing convergence problems). Since
identication of both the random coe¢ cients and the  PC;S parameter come solely from time variation, these
problems are hardly surprising given the limited time span of our data.
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6. Conclusions
In this paper we examine the incentives for a monopolist to degrade interoperability in order to
monopolize a complementary market. These type of concerns are very common in foreclosure
cases such as the European Commissions landmark 2004 Decision against Microsoft. Structural
econometric approaches to examining the plausibility of such foreclosure claims have generally
been unavailable. This paper seeks to provide such a framework, developing both a new theory
and a structural econometric method based upon this theory.
In our model, the incentive to reduce rival quality in a secondary market comes from the
desire to more e¤ectively extract rents from the primary market that are limited inter alia by the
inability to price discriminate. We detail a general model of heterogeneous demand and derived
empirically tractable conditions under which a monopolist would have incentives to degrade
interoperability. We then implement our method in the PC and server market, estimating
demand parameters with random coe¢ cients and allowing for complementarity. According to
our results it seemed that Microsoft had incentives to decrease interoperability at the turn of
the 21st century as alleged by competition authorities. In our view, the combination of theory
with strong micro-foundations and detailed demand estimation advances our ability to confront
complex issues of market abuse.
There are many limitations to what we have done and many areas for improvement. First,
our model is static, whereas it is likely that dynamic incentives are also important in foreclosure
(e.g. Carlton and Waldman, 2002). An important challenge is how to e¤ectively confront
such dynamic theoretical models with econometric evidence (see, for example, Lee, 2013). In
the context of the Microsoft case, it is likely that the dynamic e¤ects would strengthen the
incentive to foreclose as the European Commission (2004) argued. Second, we have used only
market-level data but detailed micro-information on the demand for di¤erent types of PCs and
servers could lead to improvements in e¢ ciency (see Bloom, Draca and Van Reenen, 2016, for
examples of such detailed IT data). Although we have gone some of the way in the direction
of endogenising one characteristic choice (interoperability decisions) there is still a long way to
go.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimation method OLS IV OLS IV IV IV
Dependent variable ln(Sjt)-ln(S0t) ln(Sjt)-ln(S0t) ln(Sjt)-ln(S0t) ln(Sjt)-ln(S0t) ln(Sjt)-ln(S0t) ln(Sjt)-ln(S0t)
Price -0.336*** -1.400*** -0.404*** -2.085*** -2.275*** -2.488***
(0.037) (0.281) (0.037) (0.204) (0.239) (0.258)
Benchmark 0.305*** 0.953*** 0.388*** 1.153*** 1.239*** 1.336***
(0.108) (0.211) (0.095) (0.160) (0.180) (0.190)
RAM -0.458*** 0.339 -0.333*** 0.920*** 1.062*** 1.221***
(0.101) (0.246) (0.105) (0.220) (0.239) (0.262)
CD-ROM 0.226** 0.257** 0.188* 0.278** 0.288** 0.299**
(0.095) (0.112) (0.096) (0.130) (0.136) (0.143)
Ethernet 0.140* 0.354*** 0.105 0.463*** 0.504*** 0.549***
(0.077) (0.103) (0.077) (0.109) (0.116) (0.123)
Desktop 0.375*** -0.406* 0.273*** -0.908*** -1.042*** -1.192***
(0.070) (0.213) (0.071) (0.169) (0.193) (0.208)
5th Generation 1.068*** 1.814*** 0.894*** 2.520*** 2.704*** 2.911***
(0.244) (0.364) (0.229) (0.379) (0.410) (0.432)
6th Generation 0.889*** 2.314*** 0.954*** 3.652*** 3.957*** 4.299***
(0.268) (0.496) (0.252) (0.472) (0.523) (0.556)
7th Generation 1.112*** 2.037*** 1.084*** 3.087*** 3.313*** 3.568***
(0.395) (0.526) (0.385) (0.561) (0.595) (0.626)
Monitor Size -0.066*** -0.086*** -0.066*** -0.097*** -0.101*** -0.105***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Trend -0.051*** -0.368*** -0.404*** -0.444***
(0.013) (0.041) (0.047) (0.051)
Time Dummies (21) yes yes no no no no
Overidentification test 60.383 65.425 50.836 27.114
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
1st Stage F-test 8.8 27.21 30.40 40.620
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Own Price Elasticities
Mean -0.73 -3.04 -0.88 -4.52 -4.94 -5.40
Standard deviation 0.31 1.28 0.37 1.90 2.07 2.27
Median -0.68 -2.83 -0.82 -4.21 -4.60 -5.03
% inelastic demands 85.51% 0.70% 71.44% 0.03% 0.00% 0.00%
TABLE 1 - RESULTS FOR SIMPLE LOGIT FOR PC MARKET SHARE
Notes: Demand estimates from a simple logit model based on 3,305 observations. “Benchmark” are numbers assigned to each processor-speed
combination based on technical and performance characteristics. "Generation" dummies indicate common technological characteristics shared among
central processing units. All regressions include a full set of nine hardware vendor dummies. Columns (2) and (4) use BLP-type instruments: the number
of the same form factor own-firm products, the number of the same form factor products produced by rival firms, the sum of the values of the same
characteristics (speed, RAM and hard disk) of other products of the same form factor offered by the same firm and the sum of values of the same
characteristics of all same factor products offered by rival firms. In the last two columns, we restrict the number of instruments dropping hard disks in
column (3) and also speed in column (4). Full first stage results can be found in Table A3 of the Appendix. The Hansen-Sargan test of overidentification
and the first-stage Angrist-Pischke (2009) F test of excluded instruments with the p-values in square parentheses below are reported. Robust standard
errors are reported in parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the IDC Quarterly PC Tracker data corresponding to sales and prices of PC models for large business customers
matched to more detailed PC characteristics from several industry datasources and trade magazines, US market (1996Q1-2001Q1).
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimation method OLS IV OLS IV IV IV
Dependent variable ln(Skt)-ln(S0t) ln(Skt)-ln(S0t) ln(Skt)-ln(S0t) ln(Skt)-ln(S0t) ln(Skt)-ln(S0t) ln(Skt)-ln(S0t)
Price -0.040*** -0.075*** -0.040*** -0.179*** -0.201*** -0.234***
(0.003) (0.020) (0.003) (0.031) (0.035) (0.041)
RAM 0.002 0.031* 0.002 0.116*** 0.133*** 0.161***
(0.007) (0.019) (0.008) (0.032) (0.036) (0.042)
Windows -0.861*** -0.567*** -0.867*** 0.305 0.484 0.766**
(0.113) (0.196) (0.114) (0.282) (0.310) (0.357)
Windows × RAM 0.013 0.025* 0.012 0.060*** 0.068*** 0.079***
(0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.023) (0.025) (0.029)
Symmetric Parallel Processor 0.474*** 0.705*** 0.474*** 1.388*** 1.528*** 1.748***
(0.081) (0.156) (0.081) (0.224) (0.246) (0.284)
Rack Optimized 0.455*** 0.337** 0.458*** -0.005 -0.076 -0.187
(0.110) (0.134) (0.110) (0.182) (0.197) (0.225)
Number of Racks -0.009 0.006 -0.008 0.051** 0.060** 0.074***
(0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.022) (0.024) (0.028)
Linux 0.037 0.542 -0.033 1.995*** 2.307*** 2.795***
(0.413) (0.484) (0.392) (0.605) (0.647) (0.715)
Unix -0.675*** 0.351 -0.681*** 3.393*** 4.019*** 5.000***
(0.166) (0.589) (0.168) (0.907) (1.000) (1.176)
OS390/400 -1.750*** -0.711 -1.717*** 2.390** 3.020*** 4.008***
(0.204) (0.611) (0.204) (0.936) (1.037) (1.218)
VMS -1.961*** -1.620*** -2.009*** -0.610 -0.396 -0.059
(0.255) (0.330) (0.257) (0.574) (0.639) (0.734)
Other OS -2.088*** -1.094* -2.070*** 1.874** 2.480** 3.429***
(0.222) (0.596) (0.222) (0.900) (0.992) (1.163)
Trend -0.030*** -0.144*** -0.161*** -0.189***
(0.007) (0.025) (0.028) (0.032)
Time Dummies (21) yes yes no no no no
Overidentification test 64.409 35.389 20.061 12.03
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.002]
1st Stage F-test 18.53 5.82 8.70 12.87
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Own Price Elasticities
Mean -0.63 -1.18 -0.63 -2.84 -3.18 -3.71
Standard deviation 0.62 1.15 0.62 2.79 3.12 3.64
Median -0.44 -0.83 -0.44 -2.01 -2.25 -2.62
% inelastic demands 81.13% 57.40% 80.89% 32.02% 28.08% 22.11%
TABLE 2 - RESULTS FOR SIMPLE LOGIT FOR SERVER MARKET SHARE
Notes: Demand estimates from a simple logit model based on 2,967 observations. All regressions include a full set of nine hardware vendor dummies.
Columns (2) and (6) use BLP-type instruments: the number of own-firm products, the number of products produced by rival firms, the sum of RAM of
products offered by rival firms. In columns (4) and (5) we also experiment with additional instruments based on server characteristics (sum of Rack and
Rack Optimized of products offered by rival firms and sum of Unix own-firm models) and input prices (quality adjusted indices for semi-conductors and
hard disks). Full first stage results can be found in Table A4 of the Appendix.The Hansen-Sargan test of overidentification and the first-stage Angrist-
Pischke (2009) F test of excluded intruments with the p-values in square parentheses below are reported. Robust standard errors are reported in
parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the IDC Quarterly Server Tracker data corresponding to sales and prices of server models matched to more
detailed server characteristics from several industry datasources and trade magazines, US market (1996Q1-2001Q1).
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Estimation method GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM
Imperfect 
complementarity - 
baseline model
sample of 500 
consumers
potential mkt 
size reduced 
in half
asymmetric 
potential mkt 
size
reduced 
number of 
instruments
reduced 
number of 
instruments
include 
random coef. 
on constant
reduce random 
coef. on 
servers
"free" 
complementarity
PANEL A: PC - Means
Price -3.301*** -2.795*** -3.002*** -3.353*** -3.622*** -5.598 -2.768*** -3.350*** -3.314***
(0.629) (0.501) (0.411) (0.604) (0.676) (3.882) (0.555) (0.635) (0.592)
Benchmark 0.021 -2.503 0.070 0.088 -0.786 -1.388 -1.971* 0.020 -0.153
(1.243) (1.572) (0.493) (1.114) (2.355) (5.770) (1.152) (1.229) (1.176)
RAM 0.760** 1.088*** 0.837*** 0.747** 0.639* 0.244 0.753** 0.765** 0.801***
(0.316) (0.284) (0.278) (0.303) (0.348) (0.568) (0.320) (0.312) (0.303)
CD-ROM 0.275** 0.321*** 0.261** 0.267** 0.304** 0.315 0.316** 0.275** 0.278**
(0.130) (0.140) (0.132) (0.129) (0.135) (0.193) (0.133) (0.131) (0.131)
Ethernet 0.423*** 0.490*** 0.486*** 0.410*** 0.403*** 0.305 0.443*** 0.424*** 0.444***
(0.134) (0.134) (0.127) (0.130) (0.149) (0.228) (0.136) (0.132) (0.131)
5th Generation 2.783*** 2.955*** 2.811*** 2.766*** 2.869*** 3.128*** 3.153*** 2.795*** 2.821***
(0.395) (0.461) (0.401) (0.391) (0.400) (0.547) (0.491) (0.394) (0.399)
6th Generation 4.053*** 4.517*** 4.103*** 4.007*** 4.154*** 4.296*** 4.619*** 4.066*** 4.132***
(0.574) (0.607) (0.517) (0.558) (0.616) (0.547) (0.718) (0.569) (0.567)
7th Generation 2.709*** 3.034*** 2.757*** 2.663*** 2.529*** 1.858 3.005*** 2.702*** 2.733***
(0.606) (0.738) (0.652) (0.597) (0.700) (1.335) (0.759) (0.605) (0.629)
Constant -3.426*** -3.528*** -2.708*** -3.451*** -3.269*** -2.402 -6.319** -3.379*** -3.368***
(0.708) (0.936) (0.709) (0.704) (0.653) (2.671) (2.818) (0.708) (0.704)
PANEL B: Server - Means
Price -0.282*** -0.352*** -0.288*** -0.258*** -0.249*** -0.298** -0.352*** -0.281*** -0.674***
(0.089) (0.133) (0.094) (0.085) (0.081) (0.131) (0.113) (0.086) (0.155)
RAM 0.173*** 0.203*** 0.177*** 0.162*** 0.161*** 0.180*** 0.220** 0.174*** 0.208***
(0.057) (0.058) (0.052) (0.051) (0.045) (0.060) (0.096) (0.049) (0.066)
Windows 0.794* 1.069* 0.828* 0.688 0.683** 0.888 1.342** 0.781* 1.543***
(0.451) (0.556) (0.460) (0.431) (0.342) (0.737) (0.590) (0.436) (0.483)
Windows × RAM 0.077** 0.092*** 0.078** 0.072** 0.074** 0.085* 0.102** 0.076** 0.133***
(0.034) (0.041) (0.034) (0.032) (0.033) (0.047) (0.041) (0.032) (0.039)
TABLE 3 - RESULTS FROM ALTERNATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY MODELS
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Estimation method GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM
Symmetric Parallel Processor 1.787*** 2.015*** 1.810*** 1.698*** 1.690*** 1.858*** 2.234*** 1.773*** 2.620***
(0.390) (0.498) (0.399) (0.369) (0.307) (0.665) (0.486) (0.358) (0.408)
Rack Optimized -0.185 -0.266 -0.199 -0.145 -0.154 -0.208 -0.441 -0.176 -0.373
(0.234) (0.267) (0.237) (0.223) (0.203) (0.329) (0.296) (0.227) (0.273)
Number of Racks 0.060 0.084 0.063 0.056 0.055 0.074 0.094* 0.060 0.140***
(0.039) (0.050) (0.040) (0.036) (0.035) (0.058) (0.052) (0.037) (0.034)
Constant -5.814*** -5.807*** -5.809*** -5.128*** -5.896*** -5.748*** -6.197*** -5.816*** -8.096***
(0.228) (0.260) (0.228) (0.223) (0.294) (0.269) (0.566) (0.228) (0.669)
Price 0.916** 0.520* 0.758*** 0.955*** 1.140*** 2.292 0.795*** 0.938*** 0.902***
(0.363) (0.283) (0.273) (0.346) (0.413) (1.777) (0.270) (0.362) (0.338)
Benchmark 1.321 2.794** 1.610*** 1.282* 1.938 2.690 2.658*** 1.332 1.450*
(0.822) (1.102) (0.444) (0.771) (1.532) (3.199) (0.910) (0.812) (0.752)
Constant 2.569
(1.839)
Price 0.048** 0.062** 0.048* 0.042* 0.035 0.054* 0.049* 0.049** 0.162***
(0.024) (0.031) (0.025) (0.025) (0.037) (0.030) (0.028) (0.024) (0.042)
RAM 0.014 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.000 0.007 0.017 0.027
(0.104) (0.090) (0.106) (0.103) (0.159) (0.312) (0.145) (0.091)
Constant 0.930*
(0.528)
ΓPC,S parameter 2.647**
(1.271)
GMM Objective (df) 75.613 (10) 68.583 (10) 71.783 (10) 88.356 (10) 54.146 (5) 46.723 (3) 56.899 (8) 79.292 (12) 57.493 (9)
PANEL D: Server - Standard Deviations
PANEL C: PC - Standard Deviations
TABLE 3 - RESULTS FROM ALTERNATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY MODELS - cont.
Notes: Demand estimates from the baseline model as described in section 4.1 in the text based on 6,272 observations. Parameters were estimated via a two-step GMM algorithm described in the estimation subsection 4.2. In
all columns (expect columns (5) and (6)) the instruments used are the same as in the baseline model in column (1). In column (2) we increase the number of draws relative to the baseline model to 500. In column (3) we
assume that firms make a purchase decision every two years. In column (4), we assume that firms purchase a PC every year, whereas a server bundle every two years. In column (5) we reduce the number of instruments used
to the ones corresponding to column (5) in Tables 1 and 2 for PCs and servers respectively. In column (6) we further reduce the instruments used for PCs to the ones corresponding to column (6) in Table 1. In column (7) we
include a random coefficient on the constant for both PCs and servers. In column (8), we only allow for a random coefficient on price on servers. The last column reports results from the "free complementarity" model
estimated via a two-step GMM algorithm as described in Appendix E. All specifications include all the characteristics in Tables 1 and 2, i.e. for PCs: desktop, monitor size, CD-ROM, firm dummies and time trend; for
servers: full set of operating system and firm dummies and time trend. The standard errors take into account the variance introduced through the simulation by bootstrapping fifty times the relevant component of the variance
in the moment conditions. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the IDC Quarterly PC and Server Tracker data matched to more detailed PC and Server characteristics from several industry datasources and trade magazines, US market (1996Q1-
2001Q1).
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FIGURE 1: EVOLUTION OF MARKET SHARES FOR SOFTWARE VENDORS IN US (units)
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Notes: This plots the evolution of shares for different operating systems. Shares are measures in unit volumes. Other includes operating systems include IBM’s OS390/400,
Compaq’s VMS and some other smaller non-Unix operating systems.
Source: International Data Corporation (IDC) Quarterly Server Tracker survey, US market (1996Q1-2001Q1).
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FIGURE 2: RELATIVE MARGIN AND OUTPUT EFFECTS (IMPERFECT COMPEMENTARITY)
Notes: This plots the evolution of calculated relative output and margin effects based on the formulas provided in Appendix D and their 90% confidence interval. The shaded area
highlights the period where the relative margin effect is statistically higher than the relative output effect, hence Microsoft had significant incentives to degrade according to our
model.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the IDC Quarterly PC and Server Tracker data matched to more detailed PC and Server characteristics and the estimated coefficients in
column (1) of Table 3.
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FIGURE 3D: COLUMN (4), TABLE 3
FIGURE 3: RELATIVE MARGIN AND OUTPUT EFFECTS (ROBUSTNESS)
FIGURE 3A: COLUMN (1), TABLE 3 
FIGURE 3C: COLUMN (3), TABLE 3
FIGURE 3B: COLUMN (2), TABLE 3
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on the IDC Quarterly PC and Server Tracker data matched to more detailed PC and Server characteristics and the estimated coefficients from Table 3.
Notes: These plot the evolution of calculated relative output and margin effects based on the formulas provided in Appendix D. When the relative margin effect lies above the relative output effect we predict
that there are incentives to degrade interoperability.
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FIGURE 3: RELATIVE MARGIN AND OUTPUT EFFECTS (ROBUSTNESS) - cont.
FIGURE 3H: COLUMN (8), TABLE 3
FIGURE 3E: COLUMN (5), TABLE 3
FIGURE 3G: COLUMN (7), TABLE 3
FIGURE 3F: COLUMN (6), TABLE 3
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the IDC Quarterly PC and Server Tracker data matched to more detailed PC and Server characteristics and the estimated coefficients from Table 3.
Notes: These plot the evolution of calculated relative output and margin effects based on the formulas provided in Appendix D. When the relative margin effect lies above the relative output effect we predict
that there are incentives to degrade interoperability.
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FIGURE 4: RELATIVE MARGIN AND OUTPUT EFFECTS (FREE COMPLEMENTARITY)
Notes: This plots the evolution of calculated relative output and margin effects based on the formulas provided in Appendix D and their 90% confidence interval. The shaded area
highlights the period where the relative margin effect is statistically higher than the relative output effect, hence Microsoft had significant incentives to degrade according to our
model.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the IDC Quarterly PC and Server Tracker data matched to more detailed PC and Server characteristics and the estimated coefficients in
column (9) of Table 3.
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